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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is an appeal from a twelve-count indictment 
charging the defendant, Rao Gollapudi, with violating two 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. More specifically, 
Gollapudi was charged with failing to account for and pay 
over to the Internal Revenue Service federal income taxes, 
deducted and collected from the total taxable wages of his 
employees, between 1989 and 1991, in violation of 26 
U.S.C. S 7202. Additionally, Gollapudi was indicted for filing 
a false personal income tax return, Form 1040, for the 
years 1989 through 1991, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
S 7206(1). Gollapudi now appeals on the grounds (1) that 
his prosecution for violating 26 U.S.C. S 7202 is barred by 
the three-year statute of limitations of S 6531, and (2) that 
because the responses on the 1040 he filed were truthful 
he cannot be found guilty of filing a false statement under 
S 7206(1). For reasons set forth below, we affirm the 
decision of the District Court. 
 
II. FACTS 
 
From the company's inception in 1984, the appellant, 
Rao Gollapudi, has been the president and sole shareholder 
of Softstar Computer Consultants, Incorporated ("Softstar"), 
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a Michigan corporation involved in the business of 
analyzing and improving computer systems for Fortune 500 
companies. Following the departure of his partner from the 
company in 1986, Gollapudi became solely responsible for 
preparing and filing the company's tax returns and paying 
the wages of its employees. Shortly after assuming this 
responsibility, Gollapudi failed to make any payment of 
employment taxes and stopped filing Employer's Quarterly 
Tax Returns ("941's") with the IRS. 
 
During the years 1989 through 1991, Softstar employed 
fifteen individuals, who were paid by checks drawn from 
the company's corporate checking account. Although the 
checks indicated that federal income taxes and Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") taxes were being 
withheld from the employees' wages, Gollapudi did not 
remit the withheld funds to the IRS. Rather, these funds, 
totaling approximately $527,828, were deposited into 
Softstar's corporate checking account where they were used 
to pay corporate operating expenses.1 Furthermore, by 
failing to file 941's, Gollapudi never reported the collection 
of these withholding taxes to the IRS and, thus, avoided 
detection. 
 
After an IRS tax examiner discovered that Softstar had 
failed to file the required 941's and remit any tax refunds 
to the federal government, Gollapudi admitted that 
although he collected the appropriate taxes from his 
employees, he did not turn over the withholdings to the 
IRS. Instead, he kept the money in the company. Gollapudi 
further admitted that, although he was aware of his 
obligations, he did not file the required 941's, W-2's, or 
corporate tax forms with the IRS. Subsequently, Gollapudi 
contacted an accountant, David Karpel, who on behalf of 
Gollapudi filed the delinquent 941's and corporate tax 
returns and paid $591,000 in back taxes. 
 
Gollapudi's handling of the withdrawals from his own 
salary was also questionable. Gollapudi filed a personal 
income tax return, Form 1040, for the tax years 1989, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition, Gollapudi listed the corporate checking account 
containing these funds on a personal mortgage application in order to 
overstate his assets. 
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1990, and 1991, in which he claimed that he had withheld 
approximately $6,000 in federal income taxes from himself. 
This amount was not turned over to the IRS. Additionally, 
there was a question of whether the funds were in fact 
withheld. Although the government argued that such funds 
were not withheld, Gollapudi testified that, because he did 
not receive a regular salary, his withholdings were 
calculated in a unique manner. Gollapudi explained that 
instead of receiving a regular salary, he periodically took 
disbursements from the company. At the end of each year 
he received the corporate records, calculated the total sum 
that he had paid as salary, checked the relevant tax tables 
and calculated the gross salary that would correspond to 
the net salary he had actually received. The difference 
between the gross and net salaries, he argued, was treated 
as having been withheld from his gross pay. 
 
On April 19, 1996, Gollapudi was indicted on nine counts 
of failing to account for and pay over to the IRS federal 
income taxes and FICA taxes, deducted and collected from 
the total taxable wages of his employees, for thefinal 
quarter of 1989 and for all four quarters of the years 1990 
and 1991, in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7202. In addition, 
Gollapudi was charged with three counts of filing false 
personal income tax returns for the calendar years 1989 
through 1991 in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7206(1). Prior to 
trial, Gollapudi moved to dismiss the first nine counts of 
the indictment as barred by the three year statute of 
limitations. This motion was denied. Gollapudi was found 
guilty on all counts and now appeals. 
 
III. JURISDICTION 
 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, entered 
March 7, 1997. An appeal was filed on March 10, 1997. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Statute of Limitations. 
 
The first issue before the court is whether a violation of 
26 U.S.C. S 7202, which prohibits the willful failure "to 
collect or truthfully account for and pay over" any tax,2 is 
subject to a three-or six-year statute of limitations. For the 
following reasons, we hold that the violation is subject to a 
six-year statute of limitations and thus will affirm the 
decision of the District Court on this issue. 
 
The statute of limitations governing 26 U.S.C. S 7202, as 
well as other criminal tax violations, is set forth in 26 
U.S.C. S 6531. This section generally provides that criminal 
tax proceedings must be initiated within three years of the 
offense, unless the offense falls into one of eight exceptions 
providing for a six-year period of limitations. Specifically, 
the relevant section, S 6531(4), provides that: 
 
       No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for 
       any of the various offenses arising under the internal 
       revenue laws unless the indictment is found or the 
       information instituted within 3 years next after the 
       commission of the offense, except that the period of 
       limitations shall be 6 years - 
 
       * * * * 
 
       (4) for the offense of willfully failing to pay any tax, or 
       make any return (other than a return required under 
       authority of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61) at 
       the time or times required by law or regulations; 
 
26 U.S.C. S 6531(4). The question here is whether a failure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 7202 provides: 
        Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and 
pay 
       over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect 
or 
       truthfully account for and pay over such tax shall, in addition to 
       other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon 
       conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or 
       imprisoned for more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs 
       of prosecution. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 7202. 
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to "pay over" any tax under S 7202 constitutes a failure to 
"pay any tax, or make any return," under S 6531(4), and 
thus is subject to a six rather than three-year statute of 
limitations. 
 
While the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the issue 
of whether S 6531(4) applies to criminal offenses under 
S 7202, the District Court followed the decisions of the 
Second and Tenth Circuits in holding that prosecutions for 
violations of S 7202 must be commenced within six years 
under S 6531(4). Conversely, two district courts that have 
addressed the issue have held that section 6531(4) does not 
apply to S 7202 offenses and that the applicable statute of 
limitations is three years. Gollapudi contends that the two 
district court cases are more persuasive in their analysis 
than the opinions of the circuit courts and the District 
Court in this case. 
 
Relying on United States v. Block, 497 F.Supp. 629 (N.D. 
Ga. 1980), and United States v. Brennick, 908 F.Supp. 1004 
(D. Mass. 1995), Gollapudi maintains that the plain 
language of the statute dictates that failure "to pay any tax, 
or make any return" under S 6531(4) does not encompass 
"the offense of failing to collect, account for or pay over any 
tax" under S 7202 (emphasis added). Gollapudi contends 
that because Congress explicitly distinguished between the 
failure to "pay" a tax and the failure to "pay over" a tax 
collected from another in other sections of the Internal 
Revenue Code and did not include such "pay over" 
language in S 6531, it did not intend to include the failure 
to "pay over" any tax in S 6531(4). 
 
In support of his first argument, Gollapudi notes that in 
designing the criminal tax offense set forth in 26 U.S.C. 
S 7202 et seq., Congress explicitly distinguished between 
the failure to pay a tax and the failure to pay over a tax 
collected from another, as is evident in the comparison 
between S S 7202 and 7203. Furthermore, Gollapudi 
maintains that the phrase "pay over" or "paid over" was 
used by Congress sixteen times in the Internal Revenue 
Code and, thus, constitutes a statutory term of art, 
referring to (1) third-party taxes as in S S 3505(b), 6672(a) 
and 7501; (2) other amounts collected from third parties as 
in S S 3304(a)(3) and 7652(b)(3); and (3) non-tax amounts as 
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in S S 143(g)(3)(D) and 6096(a). Gollapudi argues that 
because the phrase is a term of art, "pay over" has a 
specific meaning which is not included in nor 
interchangeable with "pay". 
 
Next, Gollapudi argues that because S 6531(4) applies to 
"the offense" (singular) of willfully failing to pay any tax or 
make any return, as opposed to any other offense, and 
because S 7203 is "the offense" which criminalized such 
acts, Congress intended that S 6532(4) apply only to the 
offense identified in S 7203,3  and not to other criminal tax 
violations. See Block, 497 F.Supp. at 632 (finding 
persuasive fact that S 6531(4) is directed at"the offense" of 
wilfully failing to pay tax, as opposed to class of offenses); 
Brennick, 908 F.Supp. at 1019 (finding that Congress had 
expressed its will "in reasonably plain terms" that S 6531(4) 
applies only to single offense described in S 7203). 
 
In interpreting a statute, the starting point is the 
language of the statute itself. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 384 (3d Cir. 
1984); United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3d Cir. 
1993). "In most situations, the plain language rule is the 
preferred method of statutory interpretation." United States 
v. Zheng, 768 F.2d 518, 523 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1060 (1986). "[O]nly the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions" in the legislative history will 
justify a departure from that language. Garcia v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). 
 
Under a plain reading of this statute, we find it clear that 
violations of S 7202 are subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations under S 6531(4). Specifically, 26 U.S.C. S 7202 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 7203 provides in relevant part: 
 
       Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or 
tax, 
       or required by this title or by regulations made under authority 
       thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any 
       information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, 
       make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, 
       at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in 
addition 
       to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor . . 
. . 
 
26 U.S.C. S 7202. 
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makes it an offense for an employer to willfully fail to 
"account for and pay over" to the IRS taxes withheld from 
employees. Given that S 6531 pertains to "failing to pay any 
tax," the District Court correctly found that the failure to 
pay third-party taxes as covered by S 7202 constitutes 
failure to pay "any tax," and thus, is subject to the six-year 
statute of limitations under S 6531(4). United States v. 
Gollapudi, 947 F.Supp. 763 (D. N.J. 1996). Accord United 
States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 500 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991) (holding that six-year statute 
of limitations in S 6531(4) is applicable to violations of 
S 7202); United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519, 522 (10th 
Cir.) (finding that S 7202 was "clearly within the six-year 
exception to the general three-year statute of limitations of 
S 6531"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). See also United 
States v. Evangelista, Nos. 1478, 1479, Dockets 96-1712(L), 
96-1718(CON), 1997 WL 459057, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 
1997) (reaffirming Musacchia, holding that six-year statute 
of limitations applies to offense defined by S 7202). 
 
Although we could conclude our analysis here as the 
statutory language in S 6531(4) is plain and unambiguous, 
United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(unambiguous language deemed "conclusive"), we will 
address why we find the Georgia and Massachusetts cases 
relied upon by Gollapudi to be unpersuasive. 
 
In United States v. Block, the court found that Congress 
had the statutory scheme of 26 U.S.C. S 7201 et seq. in 
mind when fashioning S 6531. 497 F.Supp. at 632. This 
was inferred from the facts that there are specific references 
to S 7201 et seq. provisions in S 6531, and that the 
language of S 6531 borrows extensively from various S 7201 
et seq. sections. The Block court reasoned "[i]t seems 
unlikely . . . that Congress would have used the language 
of so many of the S 7202 et seq. code sections when 
drafting the subsections of S 6531 but omit use of the key 
words of S 7202 if it had intended to make failure to `pay 
over' third-party taxes subject to the six-year statute of 
limitations." Id. 
 
We find this line of reasoning in Block unpersuasive. The 
statute of limitations for all criminal tax violations is set 
forth in 26 U.S.C. S 6531. The offenses which fall under the 
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eight exceptions to S 6531 are included either by general 
description of the proscribed conduct or by a reference to a 
specific section of the code. It is clear to us that where 
Congress intended to limit the applicability of theS 6531 
exceptions, it unambiguously did so. Thus, whereas 
subsections five, six, seven and eight of S 6531 are 
expressly limited to offenses arising under S S 7206(1) and 
7202, 7212(a), 7214(a), and 18 U.S.C. S 371 respectively, 
the District Court correctly held that subsection four 
contains a general description of offenses, not limited to 
violations of S 7203 or to any other specific offense. 
Gollapudi, 947 F.Supp. at 766. Musacchia, 900 F.2d at 500. 
As the District Court stated, "[t]he focus must be on the 
duty imposed by these specific sections of the Code, not on 
the particular words present or absent in an attempt to 
reconstruct congressional intent. An employer's duty to pay 
taxes withheld from his employees is at least as great as 
the duty to pay personal income taxes." Gollapudi, 947 
F.Supp. at 767. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that S 6531(4) uses the word 
"offense" rather than "offenses" does not convince us that 
Congress intended S 6531(4) to be limited to violations of 
S 7203. Conversely, we agree with the rationale of the 
Second Circuit in United States v. Musacchia that "the 
language of section 6531(4) -- applying the six-year statute 
of limitations to `the offense of willfully failing to pay any 
tax, or make any return . . . at the time or times required 
by law or regulations' -- suggests that it applied to any of 
several sections of the Code that define such an offense." 
900 F.2d at 500 (citing 26 U.S.C. S 6531(4)). 
 
Moreover, we find the District Court's reliance on the 
Second Circuit's decision that it would be inconsistent for 
Congress to have prescribed a six-year limitation period for 
the misdemeanor offense defined in 26 U.S.C. S 7203 
(failure to file a return or pay a tax) while providing only a 
three-year limitation period for the felony offense defined in 
S 7202, to be well-founded. Gollapudi, 947 F.Supp. at 766 
(citing Musacchia, 900 F.2d at 500). As the court in 
Musacchia concluded, it would make little sense if the 
period in which an offense could be prosecuted for the 
misdemeanor of failing to file a tax return was twice as long 
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 as the period in which an offender could be prosecuted for 
the felony of failure to pay taxes over to the IRS collected on 
behalf of employees.4 As the District Court stated, "[t]he 
focus must be on the duty imposed by these specific 
sections of the Code, not on the particular words present or 
absent in an attempt to reconstruct congressional intent. 
An employer's duty to pay taxes withheld from his 
employees is at least as great as the duty to pay personal 
income taxes." Gollapudi, 947 F.Supp. at 767. 
 
B. Filing False Income Tax Return. 
 
The second issue before us is whether the District Court 
erred in finding Gollapudi guilty of violatingS 7206(1), for 
filing a false personal tax return.5  In order to find Gollapudi 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In support of the application of the three year statute of limitations 
to 
an employer's failure to "pay over" withheld taxes, the dissent argues 
that it is more difficult for the IRS to detect an individual's failure to 
pay 
his own taxes than it is to discover an employer's failure to transfer 
funds withheld from employees. The Assistant U.S. Attorney took the 
opposite position at oral argument due to the fact that the IRS does not 
routinely cross-check employees' W-2 forms against the employers' 
payments into the IRS of taxes withheld from the employees: 
 
       HAINES:  Judge Cowen, what I was told in my office is that if 
       someone, in this case Mr. Gollapudi, is filing false withholding so 
       the individual employees file returns that look like there have 
been 
       taxes withheld because they had W-2s attached, and then in not 
       filing the 941s, it is virtually impossible -- there is no cross- 
       referencing there so the IRS can tell automatically that the 
       withholdings coming from the employees' personal income taxes are 
       not being actually . . . 
 
       COURT:  Who told you that in your office? 
 
       HAINES:  Someone who worked for the Tax Division and is now a 
       specialist in tax crimes, that actually tried this case below. In 
fact, 
       this particular case shows that. Because -- they only caught Mr. 
       Gollapudi because the W-2s themselves were hand-written and 
       looked kind of sloppy and that triggered something in one of the 
IRS 
       agents' minds that these might be fraudulent. Then after trying a 
       bunch of blind alley ways, they finally were able to track it back 
to 
       Mr. Gollapudi and find out he wasn't filing the 941s. But that was 
       the only way he was ever caught. He could have gone on for years 
       and years. 
 5. Section 7206(1) provides that any person who,"[w]illfully makes and 
subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or 
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guilty of that offense, the government had to prove that (1) 
defendant made and subscribed a return which was false 
as to a material matter; (2) the return contained a written 
declaration that it was made under the penalties of perjury; 
(3) defendant did not believe the return was true and 
correct as to every material matter; and (4) defendant 
falsely subscribed to the return willfully, with the specific 
intent to violate the law. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 
346, 350 (1973). 
 
Gollapudi contends that because his tax return was 
accurate as to the amount of federal income tax withheld 
from his gross pay and because the form did not ask 
whether the withholdings were ever submitted, he cannot 
be found guilty of this offense. Gollapudi argues that the 
amount of withholdings were accurate in that they reflected 
a "gross up" process. In addition, relying on two Seventh 
Circuit decisions, Gollapudi argues that the literal truth of 
the information on a tax return is a complete defense, even 
if the response on the return was highly misleading. United 
States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 942 (1991); United States v. Borman, 992 
F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1993) (in establishing violation of 
S 7206(1), "the untruth must be found in a statement of 
some material information called for by the form itself, and 
any implication drawn from the filing of a particular form 
. . . is simply not enough."). 
 
We must examine the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government and sustain the verdict if "any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 318 (1979). We conclude that there was ample 
evidence for the District Court to find that Gollapudi filed a 
false statement. First, an IRS agent testified that Gollapudi 
admitted that he prepared and signed the W-2 forms and 
that they were false. Additionally, although Gollapudi 
presented evidence that the withholding amounts were true 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties 
of 
perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every 
material matter . . . shall be guilty of a felony . . . ." 
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based on his "gross up" method, the District Court found 
this theory to be without merit based on the testimony of 
another IRS agent who demonstrated that no withholding 
was actually made. Moreover, it was established that the 
alleged withholding was never submitted to the IRS, but 
rather, was maintained in Gollapudi's corporate checking 
account. 
 
Furthermore, Gollapudi's reliance on Reynolds and 
Borman is misguided. Both of those cases involved 
S 7206(1) charges for filing the wrong tax form. Reynolds, 
919 F.2d at 437 ("Using the wrong form does not violate 
S 7206(1)."); Borman, 992 F.2d at 126 (holding that filing of 
improper form is not enough to establish false statement 
for S 7206(1) purposes). Furthermore, in Reynolds, the 
theory in the indictment was that one specific line (line 7) 
of the form which was filed was false. 919 F.2d at 437. The 
Seventh Circuit held that because line 7 was merely derived 
arithmetically from two other lines, and was thus an 
accurate reflection of the difference between the other two 
lines on the form, that the literal truth of the answer was 
a defense to perjury. Id. The Seventh Circuit indicated, 
however, that if the charge in the indictment had not been 
limited to that one line or if the defendant had left 
something blank indicating that he was hiding something, 
its decision would have been different. Id. 
 
Regardless, we hold that the District Court was correct in 
finding that Gollapudi filed a false statement on a tax 
return in violation of S 7206(1), in that he misstated the 
amount of his withholdings. Despite the fact that he 
understood his obligations, he submitted a form which he 
did not believe was true and accurate as to every material 
matter. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority errs in concluding that the criminal conduct 
of an employer in failing to pay over taxes withheld from the 
wages of employees, in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7202, falls 
within the fourth exception to the three-year statute of 
limitations for violations of the Internal Revenue Code 
(I.R.C.), 26 U.S.C. S 6531(4). I respectfully dissent from 
section IV-A of the majority's opinion that the statute of 
limitations for violations of S 7202 is six years rather than 
the normal three years. The conviction of the defendant, 
Rao Gollapudi, should be vacated due to the expiration of 
the three-year statute of limitations. 
 
I. 
 
Gollapudi was convicted of failing to transfer funds 
withheld from his employees' salaries in violation of S 7202. 
Section 7202 is entitled "Willful failure to collect or pay over 
tax" and reads as follows: 
 
        Any person required under this title to collect, 
       account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title 
       who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for 
       and pay over such tax shall, in addition to other 
       penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, 
       upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
       $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, 
       together with the costs of prosecution. 
 
The statute of limitations for prosecutions under the 
I.R.C. in general and S 7202 in particular is contained 
within 26 U.S.C. S 6531. Section 6531 institutes a general, 
three-year statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions 
under the I.R.C. but lists eight exceptions qualifying for a 
six-year statute of limitations. Section 6531 is entitled 
"Periods of limitation on criminal prosecutions" and reads 
in relevant part: 
 
        No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for 
       any of the various offenses arising under the internal 
       revenue laws unless the indictment is found or the 
       information instituted within 3 years next after the 
       commission of the offense, except that the period of 
       limitation shall be 6 years- 
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       * * * 
 
        (4) for the offense of willfully failing to pay any tax, or 
       make any return 
 
        (other than a return required under authority of part 
       III of 
 
        subchapter A of chapter 61) at the time or times 
       required by law or 
 
        regulations.... 
 
II. 
 
The majority makes several arguments why S 7202 falls 
within S 6531(4). First, the majority argues that, "[u]nder a 
plain reading of this statute," it is "clear" that S 7202 falls 
within S 6531(4). Maj. Op. at 7-8. The majority seizes on the 
word "any" from the language of 6531(4), "failing to pay any 
tax," and argues that, since paying over withheld funds is 
a type of tax, it qualifies as "any tax" under S 6531(4). The 
meaning of S 6531(4), according to the majority, is "plain 
and unambiguous[.]" Maj. Op. at 8. 
 
The majority then attempts to confront the argument 
that, since the exceptions to the three-year statute of 
limitations which are contained in S 6531 track and 
explicitly mention the list of offenses in 26 U.S.C. S 7201 et 
seq., the failure of S 6531(4) to mention S 7202 specifically 
means that Congress did not intend S 7202 to be included 
in S 6531(4). The majority offers two responses. First, the 
majority argues that the exceptions in S 6531 not 
specifically mentioning sections of S 7201 et seq. are to be 
viewed expansively rather than restrictively. In other words, 
exceptions (5)-(8) of S 6531 refer to specific sections among 
S 7201 et seq. and thus apply only to the sections 
enumerated, while S 6531(4) does not delineate specific 
sections to which it applies and thus covers an array of 
offenses including S 7202. Second, the majority rejects 
Gollapudi's claim that, since S 6531(4) refers to "offense" 
rather than "offenses," S 6531(4) refers only to one offense, 
namely S 7203, which uses language very similar to 
S 6531(4) and covers the offense of failing to "pay any 
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estimated tax...or make a return[.]"1 The majority points to 
S 6531(4)'s language of "failing to pay any tax, or make any 
return" as evincing that S 6531(4) applies to more than one 
type of offense and therefore encompasses S 7202 in 
addition to S 7203 and possibly other offenses. 
 
The majority subsequently argues that it would be 
"inconsistent" for Congress to prescribe a six-year statute of 
limitations for S 7203, the misdemeanor of failing to file a 
return or pay a tax, and a three-year statute of limitations 
for S 7202, which is a felony offense. According to the 
majority, the need to prevent a disparity between the 
statutes of limitations for a misdemeanor and for a felony 
should motivate us to subsume S 7202 within S 6531(4). In 
addition, the majority dismisses Gollapudi's claim that, 
because S 7202 talks of "paying over" taxes (referring to 
transferring employees' withheld taxes to the government) 
while S 6531(4) covers "pay[ing]" a tax (referring to one's 
own tax obligations), S 6531(4) cannot subsume S 7202. 
 
III. 
 
As the majority states, two circuit courts ruled that 
S 7202 receives a six-year statute of limitations by virtue of 
S 6531(4). See United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519, 521 
(10th Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Musacchia, 900 
F.2d 493, 500 (2d Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 
955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991). In contrast, two district courts 
rejected any linkage between S 6531(4) and S 7202, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Title 26, United States Code, S 7203 is entitled "Willful failure to 
file 
return, supply information, or pay tax" and reads in relevant part: 
 
       Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or 
tax, 
       or required by this title or by regulations made under authority 
       thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any 
       information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, 
       make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, 
       at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in 
addition 
       to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, 
       upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $26,000 
       ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or be imprisoned not more 
       than 1 year, or both, together with the cost of prosecution.... 
 
(emphasis added). 
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therefore applying the three-year statute of limitations to 
S 7202. See United States v. Brennick, 908 F.Supp. 1004, 
1019 (D.Mass. 1995); see also United States v. Block, 497 
F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Ga. 1980). However, the Tenth 
Circuit's decision, holding that S 6531(4) covers S 7202, is 
conclusory and furnishes no analytical assistance or 
weighty precedential authority. The decision offers a string 
of citations, but none deals with the relationship between 
S 7202 and S 6531(4). See Porth, 426 F.2d at 521; see also 
Block, 497 F.Supp. at 631 (the cases mentioned in Porth do 
not support Porth's conclusion); Brennick, 908 F.Supp. 
1018 n.6 (none of the cases cited by Porth supports Porth's 
conclusion). In addition to the lack of analysis, the Tenth 
Circuit in Porth also argued in the alternative, stating 
immediately after its S 6531(4) pronouncement that the first 
indictment in the case, which occurred within three years 
of the offenses, should be looked to for statute of limitations 
purposes despite the fact that the first indictment was 
dismissed for technical reasons. See Porth, 426 F.2d at 521. 
The Tenth Circuit itself appears uncertain of the strength of 
its own S 6531(4) conclusion, undermining the authority of 
its decision. 
 
IV. 
 
I respectfully disagree with the arguments raised by the 
majority and by the Second Circuit in Musacchia. The 
majority claims that the plain meaning of S 6531(4) clearly 
encompasses S 7202, vitiating any need for other 
techniques of statutory interpretation. However, the 
meaning of S 6531(4) is anything but plain and 
unambiguous. While the majority claims that S 6531(4) is 
clear by stressing the importance of the word "any[,]" the 
majority ignores the fact that applying S 6531(4) effectively 
swallows the general rule of a three-year statute of 
limitations for tax offenses. Nearly every violation of the 
I.R.C. translates into an attempt not to pay taxes. Seizing 
on "any" to broaden the reach of S 6531(4) in order to 
include S 7202 has the net effect of vastly expanding 
S 6531(4), shrinking the applicability of the three-year 
statute of limitations to near oblivion and rendering the 
other seven exceptions to the three-year statute of 
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limitations nugatory. The majority provides no principled 
rationale for delineating the contours of its expanded 
S 6531(4). As I argue below, the term "any" could properly 
refer only to tax obligations encompassed by the word "pay" 
but not obligations to "pay over" taxes. Accordingly, the 
meaning of S 6531(4) is far from plain and unambiguous. It 
calls for judicial interpretation. 
 
Resolving S 6531(4)'s ambiguity activates two venerated 
members of the canon of statutory interpretation which the 
majority ignored. First, `excepting' clauses are to be 
interpreted narrowly. See United States v. McElvain, 272 
U.S. 633, 639, 47 S. Ct. 219, 220 (1926); see also United 
States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521-2, 52 S. Ct. 416, 417 
(1932). Second, criminal statutes are to be interpreted in 
favor of repose. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
322 n.14, 92 S. Ct. 455, 464 n.14 (1971). These principles 
provide the framework for determining the meaning and 
scope of S 6531(4). As a result, the excepting clause of 
S 6531(4) must be interpreted narrowly, especially given 
that the instant statute deals with criminal liability. 
 
Moving to the text at issue here, the majority dismisses 
the difference between the terms "pay" and "pay over" too 
handily.2 Both S 7202 and its civil analogue, 26 U.S.C. 
S 6672, use the term "pay over" in the context of 
transferring employees' withheld funds to the government, 
strongly implying that "pay over" is a statutory term of art 
referring to transferring a third-party's taxes to the 
government. While the use of the term "pay over" by the 
United States Code does not rise to the level of a statutory 
term of art, the term "pay over" does have a strong 
tendency to refer to transferring a third-party's taxes to the 
government. Accordingly, the majority misses the point by 
stressing the importance of "any" in S 6531(4). Even if "any" 
is to be interpreted expansively as referring to all taxes 
owed, the expansiveness is only within the category of taxes 
that are `paid,' not the category of funds `paid over.' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Block Court rejected the argument that "pay" includes "pay over," 
noting that "although a lay person would probably use this approach, 
the drafters of s 6531 more likely would have used the terms as are 
reflected in ss 7201 et seq [sic]." Block, 497 F.Supp. at 632 n.2. 
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V. 
 
The majority argues that having different statutes of 
limitations for S 7202 and S 7203 would reflect inconsistent 
decisionmaking on the part of Congress. The answer to the 
inconsistency charge lies in observing the difference 
between the crimes of failure to transfer withheld funds and 
failure to pay one's own taxes. In the case of transferring 
withheld funds, an employer fails to transfer the funds 
withheld from several if not hundreds of employees. The 
more employees affected, the greater the chances that the 
I.R.S. will discover the crime. In the case of an individual 
failing to pay his own taxes, such a crime is harder for the 
I.R.S. to detect since only one individual's return is 
involved. Accordingly, it would make sense to apply the 
normal statute of limitations (three years) to the crime of 
failing to pay withheld taxes since the I.R.S. has greater 
potential to discover the crime; in the case of the single 
individual, the I.R.S. has greater difficulty in discovering 
the crime and needs an extended statute of limitations.3 
Furthermore, even if Congress was inconsistent in 
authorizing a three-year statute of limitations forS 7202 
and a six-year statute of limitations for S 7203, it is not our 
prerogative to remedy the inconsistency. To interpret a 
statute in a manner designed to resolve a putative policy- 
based inconsistency brings the court into the forbidden 
realm of legislative policy-making. 
 
VI. 
 
Finally, the majority selects the wrong inference from the 
fact that S 6531 tracks S 7201 et seq. While SS 6531(5)-(8) 
specifically refer to sections in S 7201 et seq., S 6531(4) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority contests this by citing the statement of the Assistant 
U.S. 
Attorney during oral argument that the I.R.S. does not routinely cross- 
check employees' W-2 forms against employers' payments of funds 
withheld from employees' wages. See Maj. Op. at 10 n.4. However, this 
statement by the AUSA, attributed to "[s]omeone who worked for the Tax 
Division and is now a specialist in tax crimes," is not contained in the 
record and reflects a litigation position taken during oral argument. This 
court should not adopt such a counter-intuitive notion without adequate 
evidentiary support. 
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does not contain an explicit reference. The majority infers 
from this lack of a specific reference in S 6531(4) that it 
covers more than just the section it clearly parallels, 
S 7203, and encompasses S 7202 as well.4 However, the 
majority ignores the need to construe excepting clauses 
restrictively and to interpret criminal statutes in favor of 
repose. Indeed, S 6531's tracking of S 7201 et seq. gives rise 
to an alternative inference, namely that even though 
S 6531(4) fails to mention S 7203, S 6531(4) still should be 
viewed in the context of the tracking by its sister 
exceptions. In other words, since exceptions (5)-(8) explicitly 
track sections of S 7201 et seq., Congress may have 
intended S 6531(4) to track S 7203 by virtue of the similarity 
in language between the two provisions even thoughS 7203 
is not mentioned explicitly. In fact, the close similarity 
between the diction of S 7203 and S 6531(4) may have 
obviated the need for S 6531(4) to mentionS 7203 explicitly. 
This argument is buttressed by the contention that 
S 6531(4) refers to only one "offense" rather than "offenses," 
which must be S 7203 rather than S 7202 given the 
similarity of language between S 7203 and S 6531(4). In 
sum, while the majority's inference is plausible, another 
possible inference exists. Our duty to construe S 6531(4) 
restrictively and in favor of repose requires selecting the 
inference that S 6531(4) tracks only S 7203, not S 7202 as 
well. 
 
VII. 
 
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's conclusion that violations of S 7202 receive a six- 
year rather than a three-year statute of limitations. The 
district court's decision should be reversed and the 
conviction of Gollapudi vacated due to the expiration of the 
three-year statute of limitations prior to the commencement 
of prosecution. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 6531(4) is closely aligned with S 7203 since S 6531(4) refers 
to 
"the offense of willfully failing to pay any tax, or make any return[,]" 
S 7203 covers "[a]ny person...who willfully fails to pay such estimated 
tax 
or tax, make such return" and S 7202 merely adverts to "[a]ny person 
required to collect, account for, and pay over any tax...." 
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